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FLOODING IN KANSAS:
RESPONDENTS' SATISFACTION WITH EMERGENCY
RESPONSE MEASURES AND DISASTER AID
Bimal Kanti Paul
Department of Geography
Kansas State University
Manhattan, KS 66506
bkp@ksu.edu
ABSTRACT -Several counties of south-central and southeast Kansas experienced floods in the first week of November 1998. The communities of Arkansas City and Augusta were among those most severely
affected by these floods. This study is based primarily on a mail questionnaire survey of residents of these two communities, and it examines
respondents' satisfaction with four emergency response measures employed by local officials and emergency management agencies before
and during the flood event. The extent of external support victims received and the level of their satisfaction with that support were also
investigated. The analysis of the survey data shows that the emergency
response efforts and the support victims received were rated poorly.
Furthermore, the satisfaction scores differed significantly between respondents from Arkansas City and those from Augusta. The findings
suggest that the extent of damage and preparedness are directly associated with victims' satisfaction with emergency measures undertaken by
emergency management agencies. The study further suggests that the
respondents of Arkansas City were relatively more satisfied with emergency measures than their counterparts in Augusta. Unlike in Arkansas
City, city officials in Augusta had little time to prepare for the flooding.
Hazard preparedness appears to be an important determinant of victims'
satisfaction with emergency measures.
KEY WORDS: emergency measures, external support, flash flood evacuation,
flash flood watch, flash flood warning, floods, Kansas

Introduction
Thirteen counties of south-central and southeast Kansas experienced
flash floods in November 1998. Flash floods occur within six hours of the
rain event and are characterized by a sharp rise in the water level followed
by a rapid recession (NOAA/FEMA/ARC 1992; Smith and Ward 1998). The
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1998 flash floods in Kansas forced hundreds from their homes and caused
over $37.8 million in damage, mostly in Butler, Cowley, and Sedgwick
Counties (Paul 1999). Two dozen rivers and streams in the flood-affected
counties flowed out of their banks on the first four days of November as a
result of heavy rains that began on 30 October 1998. All 13 flood-affected
counties were declared disaster areas by the state and three of them were
later declared federal disaster areas by the president of the United States
(Fig. 1). Butler, Cowley, and Sedgwick Counties, where more than 1,600
homes were flooded, suffered the most damage. In Butler County alone,
over 800 homes, including 230 mobile homes, were damaged.
Several cities in the affected counties were inundated with flood waters, but Augusta in Butler County and Arkansas City in Cowley County
suffered the most damage (Figure 1). The primary objective of this study is
to examine residents' satisfaction with four emergency response measures
employed by local officials and emergency management agencies in these
two communities before and during the November 1998 flash flooding. The
extent of external support victims received and the level of their satisfaction
with that support are also investigated. Satisfaction levels are analyzed by
community of residence, and by personal and/or household attributes of the
respondents. The emergency measures considered are: the issuance of flood
watches and flood warnings, evacuation, and other preventive measures
such as sandbagging.

Flash Flood Research in the United States
Flash floods are localized extreme events and are characteristic of
steep stream slopes and impervious urbanized areas (Tobin and Montz
1994, 1997). Several factors contribute to flash flooding. The two key
elements are intensity and duration of rainfall. Local atmospheric, topographic, and soil conditions, ground cover, and drainage basin characteristics also play an important role. Flash floods can occur within a few minutes
or hours of excessive rainfall, dam or levee failure, or sudden release of
water held by an ice jam (Bryant 1991). They can roll boulders, tear out
trees, and destroy buildings and bridges, and trigger catastrophic mud slides.
Fast-moving water associated with flash floods can even float cars.
Floods have been the most costly natural hazard in the United States in
terms of deaths and loss of property and crops (Mileti 1999). Catastrophic
floods have therefore received considerable attention from hazard researchers during the past several decades. Research on flood hazards in the United
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Figure I. Location of the slUdy area in Kan sas . Shaded gray counties were declared
state and federal Disaster Areas. Counties in black were declared a Disaster Area by
the state.

States began with the pioneer work by White (1945) , which ultimately led to
the development of human ecological approach to hazard study (W hite
1974). While most flood deaths and damage in the country are due to flash
flood s (see NOAA/FEMA/ARC 1992), the research on this phenomenon
has started only in the late 19705.
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Figure 2. A Flood map of Arkansas City, Kansas.

of Arkansas City (Fig. 2). The floodwater started to recede from this and other
parts of the city on 5 November 1998 (Arkansas City Traveler 1998).
The southwestern part of Arkansas City was flooded because the Arkansas River overflowed the dike, and an old levee near the river broke as
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Figure 3. Flood readings on the Arkansas River and Walnut River, Arkansas City,

31 October-S November 1998.

a result of prolonged ex posure to high water (Fig. 2). There were several
breaches and two si nkholes in the levee on the sou th side of the city. Under
the new flood-protection plan, a new levee around the south side of Arkansas City is to be completed by 2004. Had it been completed before the 1998
flooding. it is lik e ly that no areas in the southeast and southwestern parts of
the city would have been inundated (Arkansas City Traveler 1998).
Augusta, population 8,700, also experienced flooding from two rivers:
the Whitewater and the Walnut, whose waters topped a 35-foot (10.67 m)
levee surrounding the town. The Whitewater river from the west and the
Wa ln ut Ri ver from the east converge immediately sou th of Augusta (Fig. 4).
Both rivers reached a crest of about 37 feet (I 1.27 m) above river bottom , or
16 feet (4.87 m) above their flood stages of 21 feet (6.4 m) early in the
morning of 2 November 1998 as a result of heavy rainfall that started at
night on 30 October 1998. Hours ahead of the crest, parts of Augusta were
already submerged by floodwater. Nearly 600 homes and 90 businesses
were devastated by this fla sh flood and flood-related damage is estimated in
excess of $2 million (Manhattan Mercury 1998).
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Floodwater e nte red Aug usta at several location s and submerged parts

of the city for abou t three days. The Whitewater Ri ver topped the levee on
the southwest portion of the levee system and even tu all y eroded the levee

from the in side. The centra l business di strict of the city was under 5 to 7 feel
( 1.52 to 2.13 m) of water. More than 300 homes and 30 businesses were
evac uated in Augusta. The Red Cross es tab li shed a shelter at the First
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Christian Church where about 1,000 people took refuge for several days
(Kansas State Collegian 1998). Like Arkansas City, Augusta experienced
flooding in 1993 and 1995, but damage did not compare to that sustained in
the 1998 flash flood event. Both Arkansas City and Augusta have been
participating in the National Flood Insurance Program since the early-l 990s
(Arkansas City Traveler 1998).

Sources of Data. Analysis in this study is primarily based on a mail
questionnaire survey conducted following the flash flood event, beginning
in November 1998 and ending in March 1999. Relevant information was
also collected through personal interviews with key personnel such as city
officials, longtime city residents, and emergency management personnel.
Assistant city managers of Arkansas City and Augusta provided maps of
flood-affected areas, addresses of the flood victims, and other flood-related
documents. Discussions and informal interviews with the managers and
other key personnel were very useful in understanding and evaluating the
emergency measures undertaken by both public and private agencies in the
selected communities.
Personal opinions regarding the emergency response measures and the
recovery activities of the affected areas were collected through the questionnaire survey. In addition to inquiring about overall satisfaction level
with the emergency measures and support received, the questionnaire also
requested information about the extent of damage incurred by the flood, the
amount of emergency assistance provided by various organizations, and any
adjustments made at the household level. Respondents were also asked to
provide other information such as flood insurance status as well as selected
household and individual characteristics.
According to the documents (City Office of Arkansas City 1998; City
Office of Augusta 1998) provided by the city managers, there were 373
households in the flood-affected areas of Arkansas City and 338 in Augusta.
Nearly two-thirds of the families in affected areas of both cities experienced
damage from the 1998 flood. Since this study seeks personal opinions of
both victims and nonvictims of the affected areas, these two groups of
people were included in the questionnaire survey. This dictated a large
sample size, which was also necessary because a low response rate was
anticipated. Daily newspapers in eastern Kansas had reported that not all
flood victims planned to return to their homes soon and that several people
had already migrated to other cities (see Arkansas City Traveler 1998;
Manhattan Mercury 1998).
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A sample size of 200 for Arkansas City and 180 for Augusta was selected.
Respondents were randomly selected from the address list provided by the city
officials. Distribution of the questionnaire through the mail began the
last week of January 1999, and the survey ended in the last week of
March 1999. Within a week of the initial mailing, about 25% of the
questionnaires were returned uncompleted because no one now lived at
the specified addresses and forwarding addresses were unavailable to
the postal service. Additionally, the address list provided by city officials contained several errors.
The return rate of incomplete questionnaires was 6% higher among
mobile-home residents relative to occupants of single-family dwellings,
duplexes, and multifamily apartment complexes. More mobile homes were
affected by flash flooding in Augusta than in Arkansas City, thus the return
rate of incomplete questionnaires was also 3% higher in Augusta than in
Arkansas City. Since response rates do not differ significantly among different occupant groups and between affected and nonaffected groups, a
nonresponse bias is unlikely to affect the results of this study. A second
mailing of the questionnaire was directed to those respondents who did not
return their questionnaire by the specified date and was needed in order to
obtain a reasonable number of samples for this study. The analysis in this
study is based on 128 usable questionnaires: 70 from Arkansas City and 58
from Augusta.

Emergency Response Measures Selected. Four activities were considered under the category of emergency response measures: the issuance of
flash flood watches, the issuance of flood warnings, evacuation, and other
related emergency measures-such as sandbagging and construction of
emergency dikes. The issuance of a flash flood watch indicates flash flooding is possible within the designated watch area (NOAA/FEMA/ARC 1992).
A flash flood watch usually alerts people in the area of concern and permits
time for remedial activities such as moving furniture and valuables to higher
floors of the home, and for preparing vehicles in case an evacuation order is
issued (NDSU Extension Service 1999). After a flood watch is issued,
people are advised to monitor TV and/or radio broadcasts for additional
information, particularly the possibility of an upgrade of the watch to a
flood warning.
A flash flood warning is issued when a flash flood is occurring or will
occur very soon in the area of concern (NOAA/FEMA/ARC 1992). Loss of
life and damage can be greatly reduced if the warning is issued in a timely
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manner. Local emergency managers and the National Weather Service
through local television and radio stations have the authority to issue a
flood warning and advise people whether to evacuate or not. If an evacuation is ordered, people are advised to leave their homes as soon as possible
and take refuge on higher ground away from rivers, streams, creeks, and
storm drains.
Respondents' satisfaction with each of the four selected measures was
examined using a 1-5 Likert Scale, in which 1 reflects the greatest dissatisfaction and 5 indicates the greatest level of satisfaction. A score of 3 infers
that the respondent was neither particularly dissatisfied nor satisfied. The
scale was also used to record the respondents' overall satisfaction level with
emergency assistance received.
Although emergency measures were initiated in both selected communities by city officials, and similar types of private and public agencies
responded, a comparative approach is used to examine whether the responses of the communities differ from each other with respect to each of
the four emergency measures as well as with external support. Available
studies (e.g., Blaikie et al. 1994; Bolin and Stanford 1998) suggest that the
ability of a city to undertake emergency measures in a timely manner
depends on city resources, which in turn depend on size, level of development, and location of the city. Small size, low level of development, and
remote location are generally inversely related to the ability of a city to
initiate adequate emergency measures. The two selected cities differ in
location, size, and the level of development. They also differ with respect to
time of onset and duration of the flood. Level of development is represented
by variables such as annual income and level of education of the residents
(Blaikie et al. 1994; Bolin and Stanford 1998).
Available hazard literature suggests that the differences in satisfaction
with emergency measures and external support are a function of income,
educational level, age, gender (see Gruntfest 1977; Haas et al. 1977; Blaikie
et al. 1994), residential status of respondents in terms of location within the
100-year floodplain, past flood experience, and flood insurance status (see
Tobin and Montz 1997; Mileti 1999). An average of all satisfaction scores of
each respondent with the four emergency measures was. calculated and
rounded to the nearest whole number. This grand average score also ranges
from 1 to 5, with 5 indicating the most satisfied score.
Chi-square tests of association were then used to test for differences
between the satisfaction score and seven selected variables: annual income,
educational level, age, gender, flood experience, flood insurance at the time
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of flooding, and city of residence. Since flood insurance status and location
of residence within the 100-year flood plain are highly related to each other
(r = .78), only the former is considered. A similar approach is adopted to test
for differences in level of satisfaction with support received and the
aforementioned variables.
Characteristics of the Respondents. Table 1 presents selected socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the respondents. A majority
(54.76%) of the respondents were female, and nearly 67% were married at
the time of the survey. The age of the respondents ranged from 21 to 86, with
a median age of 44. Forty-four percent of the respondents belonged to the
30-44 age group, and the age group labeled under 30 accounted for nearly
25% of all respondents. Nearly half of the respondents had a high school
diploma and nearly one-fourth had an undergraduate degree; one-sixth of
all respondents had a graduate degree.
Nearly 44% of the respondents were employed full-time at the time of
the survey. Another 12% reported part-time employment. Some 27% of all
respondents were retired and 17% were grouped under the "others" category, which included the unemployed, students, the disabled, and homemakers. The unemployment rate was very low in the study area. The modal
gross family income was between $20,000 and $39,999 per year. Only 10%
of the respondent households had a yearly income higher than $59,999, and
31 % earned less than $20,000 annually.
Table 1 further shows that among all the respondents, 92 (71.88%)
directly experienced flooding in 1998. This means that their homes were
inundated and the flood caused damage to their property and belongings.
The homes of the remaining 36 respondents (18.13%) were not flooded, but
many of them reported that floodwater came very close to their homes. Only
17% of the respondents had flood insurance at the time of this flash flood
event.
Among the eight socioeconomic and demographic characteristics reported in Table 1, five differ statistically between the two selected cities.
They are: gender, age, education, income, and flood experience. While a
majority of the respondents in Arkansas City were male, female respondents
outnumbered male respondents in Augusta. Arkansas City respondents were
younger in general and tended to have an elementary education relative to
those from Augusta. The number of respondents who experienced flooding
also differs between the two study sites (Table 1). Slightly over 83% of the
Augusta respondents reported experiencing the flood compared with 62%
for the respondents from Arkansas City.
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TABLE 1
SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS BY STUDY COMMUNITY
Characteristics
Gender
Male
Female

Number of respondents (%)
Arkansas City
Augusta
40 (58.82)
28 (41.18)
X2 = 11.006 (d.f. = l;p

Total
number' (%)

17 (29.31)
41 (70.69)

57 (45.24)
69 (54.76)

II (16.18)
45 (66.18)
7 (10.29)
5 (7.35)
X' = 0.717 (d.f. = 3;p = 0.869)

7 (11.86)
40 (67.80)
6 (10.17)
6 (10.17)

18 (14.17)
85 (66.93)
13 (10.24)
11 (8.66)

23 (40.35)
25 (43.23)
4 (7.02)
5 (8.77)
X' = 21.304 (d.f. = 3;p

4 (7.69)
23 (44.23)
15 (28.85)
10 (19.23)

27
48
19
15

Education (highest level completed)
Grade school
9 (13.24)
High school
32 (47.06)
12 (17.65)
Undergraduate
9 (13.43)
Graduate
Postgraduate"
5 (7.46)
X' = 8.507 (d.f. = 3; p = 0.037)

I (1.72)
28 (48.28)
19 (32.76)
9 (15.52)
1 (1.72)

10 (7.94)
60 (47.62)
31 (24.60)
18 (14.40)
6 (4.80)

Employment
Employed full-time
Employed part-time
Retired
Others
X' = 4.432

27 (45.76)
10 (16.95)
13 (22.03)
9 (15.26)

53
14
33
21

(43.80)
(11.57)
(27.27)
(17.36)

Income
<$20,000
23 (40.35)
$20,000-39,999
25 (43.86)
$40,000-59,999
5 (8.77)
4 (7.02)
>$59,999 b
X2 = 6.373 (d.f. = 3; P = 0.037)

13 (22.41)
26 (44.83)
11 (18.97)
8 (13.79)

36
51
16
12

(31.30)
(44.35)
(13.91)
(10.43)

1998 flood experience
Yes
42 (61.76)
No
26 (38.24)
X2 = 7.335 (d.f. = 1; p = 0.007)

50 (83.33)
10 (16.67)

92 (71.88)
36 (28.13)

Flood insurance at the time of flooding
Yes
14 (22.58)
48 (77.42)
No
X2 = 0.007 (d.f. = I; p = 0.935)

5 (24.59)
46 (75.41)

29 (23.58)
94 (76.42)

Marital status
Single
Married
Divorced
Widowed
Age (years)
<30
30-44
45-64
>64

= 0.001)

= 0.001)

26 (41.94)
4 (6.45)
20 (32.26)
12 (19.35)
(d.f. = 3; P = 0.218)

(24.77)
(44.04)
(17.43)
(13.76)

Note: X2 = chi-square value, d.f. = degrees of freedom, and p = probability value.
'Not all respondents provided all personal iriformation asked in the questionnaire and thus
the number of responses will differ from one characteristic to another.
"Merged with "Graduate" category to calculate chi-square value.
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Results

Eighty-two (89.13%) of the 92 respondents who experienced flash
flooding supplied a list of items damaged by the flood; 77 of them reported
the amount of loss caused by the flood. Damage estimates provided by
respondents amounted to a total of about $2.24 million; this figure represents an average loss of $29,000 per respondent. The reported extent of
damage caused by the flood differs remarkably between the two study
communities. Average flood damage, in monetary terms, was much higher
for the respondents in Augusta ($41,000) compared to those in Arkansas
City ($14,000).
As mentioned earlier, four emergency response measures were considered in this study. Respondents' satisfaction with these measures individually and collectively is examined in the following sections.

Flash Flood Watch. The flood watch was issued by the National
Weather Service at 9:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. in Augusta and Arkansas City,
respectively, on 1 November 1998. Respondents' satisfaction level with
flood watch is presented in Table 2. It appears that 122 (95.31 %) of the 128
respondents expressed their level of satisfaction with the flood watch. Sixtytwo (50.82%) of them were very dissatisfied, while only six (4.9%) respondents were very satisfied with the flood watch alerts (Table 2). Importantly,
88 (72.13%) of the 122 respondents believed that either there was no flood
watch issued in their neighborhoods or one was not issued in a timely
manner. This might be one reason for the high level of dissatisfaction
reported for the flood watch component of the emergency measures considered in this study.
Irrespective of their flood experience, all respondents were asked to
rate their overall satisfaction level with the flood watches. The results
suggest that the severity of flooding was negatively related to the satisfaction level of the respondents. Augusta was more severely affected by the
flash flooding in 1998 than Arkansas City. The flood occurred more rapidly
and stayed longer in Augusta than Arkansas City. Additionally, the field
survey reveals that the city authorities of Augusta had little time to prepare
for the imminent flooding. The waters inundated the community so suddenly and unexpectedly that authorities had little time for advance warnings. In the words of a respondent: "Everything happened fast-the levee
broke fast, the water came fast, and rose fast."
For the above reasons, satisfaction is lower for the respondents from
Augusta than for respondents from Arkansas City (Table 2). The chi-square
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TABLE 2
RESPONDENT SATISFACTION LEVEL WITH SELECTED EMERGENCY
RESPONSE MEASURES
Flood
watch

Flood
warnings

Flood
evacuation

Other
emergency
measures

All
measures

2
3
4
5
Total

62
17
25
12
6
122a

71
15
15
15
6
122

54
20
25
17
6
122

42
15
27
21
17
122

26
41
26
16
2
111 b

Average score
Study area
Arkansas City
Augusta

2.04
2.38
1.64

1.93
2.24
1.57

2.19
2.35
2.00

2.64
2.81
2.45

2.34
2.61
2.00

12.063
(3/0.007)

7.416
(3/0.060)

2.892
(3/0.409)

2.519
(4/0.640)

9.417
(3/0.024)

Satisfaction
level
1

x2-value
(d.f.Jp)

a122 of the 128 respondents expressed their satisfaction level with the four selected
emergency measures considered in this study. But not the same 122 respondents expressed their satisfaction level with each one of the selected measures.
bOnly 111 respondents expressed their satisfaction level with all four selected emergency measures.

test demonstrated a highly significant difference between respondents of
these two cities with respect to the overall satisfaction level with the flood
watch alert. In Table 2, respondent satisfaction levels are not disaggregated
by study site because, with the exception of the flood watch alert, the
remaining measures did not differ significantly between the two study sites
(Table 2).

Flash Flood Warning. In addition to the dissemination of flood warnings through TV and radio, police, fire department, and civil defense personnel delivered flood warning bulletins and flyers to residents of several
low-lying areas in both Arkansas City and Augusta. The dissemination
began at 2:30 p.m. in Augusta on I November 1998 and and 3:00 p.m. in
Arkansas City on the following day. Nearly three-fourths of the respondents
surveyed were not pleased with the flood warning component of the emergency response measures considered in this study. Of the 122 respondents
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who did rate their satisfaction level, 71 (58.20%) were very dissatisfied,
while only six respondents (4.92%) were very satisfied with the flood
warning (Table 2). The average satisfaction score for the flood warning is
1.93, signifying that the respondents of both cities were displeased. Similar
to the response for flood watches, the average level of satisfaction with
flood warnings was higher for the respondents from Arkansas City than
those from Augusta; however, the difference was not statistically significant
at the p < 0.05 level (Table 2).
Several respondents from Arkansas City claimed that the city authorities knew several hours in advance that certain parts of the city were going
to be flooded, but deliberately informed people that they had nothing to
worry about in order to avoid creating a panic situation. Nearly threefourths of the respondents in both communities studied reported that there
was no flood warning in their area or it was not delivered in a timely manner.
Several respondents from Augusta reported that they called the city office
and the local radio station during the evening hours of 1 November 1998
regarding flood warnings but did not receive any useful information from
them. Conversely, a considerable number of respondents in both cities
ignored the warnings that were issued and did nothing to safeguard their
property and belongings. All of them were very dissatisfied with the flood
warning component of the emergency measures considered in this study.
A number of respondents in both cities saw police or other city officials in the vicinity, but these personnel did not instruct anyone to leave the
area nor was instruction given about what to do in the event of flash flooding
or where to go for shelter. Several respondents acknowledged receiving a
flood warning, but felt that their houses were far enough from the f1oodprone areas that they did not take any action. An overwhelming majority of
the respondents thought that authorities of both cities failed to caution
residents regarding the flash flooding. Some respondents from Augusta
suggested that if the fire or tornado siren had sounded, more people would
have been alerted. But Augusta city policy is to activate the storm sirens
only in the case of a tornado, and if the city would have sounded the siren,
some residents in the affected areas may have gone into their basements and
may not have been able to get out.

Flash Flood Evacuation. The evacuation of people from flood-affected areas started about 11 :30 pm on 1 November 1998 in Augusta and in
the early morning hours on 3 November 1998 in Arkansas City. Rescue
teams evacuated families from their homes by boats in both cities and
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victims were taken to flood shelters set up at two churches by the American
Red Cross-one in Arkansas City and the other in Augusta. Nearly one
dozen organizations including the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the Lions
Club, area churches, city police, the fire department, and the Army National
Guard were involved in the flood evacuation process. Friends and relatives
also helped many respondents evacuate their property.
The questionnaire survey shows that of the 128 respondents, 105
(82.03%) had to evacuate their homes as a result of the flooding. The
evacuation rate was nearly 10% higher among the respondents in Augusta
compared to those in Arkansas City. All the respondents who evacuated
their residences were asked about the location and nature of their temporary
accommodations. As has been found in previous studies (e.g., O'Brien and
Payne 1997; Mileti et al. 1992; Dymon 1999), friends and relatives were the
major source of the temporary accommodations provided for evacuees of
both cities. Fifty-nine respondents (56.19%) stayed and/or were still staying
with friends and relatives at the time of the survey. Twenty evacuees found
accommodations with their parents or other family members and nineteen
stayed in motels. Only 10 respondents stayed in flood shelters; the remaining respondents lived in rented apartments or in trailer parks. Most of the
evacuees stayed within a five-mile radius of their homes. Nearly half of the
respondents who stayed in motels and flood shelters were there for several
days before moving in with friends and relatives or to rented apartments.
The survey indicates that respondents who evacuated their property
lived on average about 20 days outside their homes. Eighty-four (80%) of
the 105 respondents who were required to evacuate stayed elsewhere before
returning to their homes. While away, these respondents returned periodically to repair their damaged homes. Of the evacuees, 10 respondents were
still living with their friends or relatives at the time of questionnaire survey.
The average length of stay outside the home was six days longer for the
respondents from Augusta than those from Arkansas City.
Irrespective of flood experience and evacuation status, all respondents
were asked to express their satisfaction with the flood evacuation efforts
using the five-point Likert Scale. The average score was 2.19, indicating
that a majority of respondents from both sites were generally dissatisfied
with the way the two selected cities handled the evacuation (Table 2).
Specifically, respondents from Augusta were more dissatisfied with evacuation measures than those from Arkansas City. Nearly two-thirds of all
respondents indicated that the flood evacuation was not as effectively executed by authorities as it could have been. Ten respondents evacuated
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themselves after their friends told them that the dike had broken. Three
respondents evacuated their mobile homes because the gas line was disconnected by the gas company. Most respondents, however, expressed general
satisfaction with evacuation efforts undertaken by the Red Cross, Salvation
Army, and area churches.

Other Emergency Measures. Other emergency measures undertaken
by various organizations before and/or during the flooding included sandbagging, traffic control, and food distribution to flood victims. In addition
to the various emergency management agencies and city departments, area
churches, local and national voluntary organizations, and local businesses
participated in these emergency measures as did individual residents of
Arkansas City, Augusta, and neighboring communities.
The survey indicates that nearly 25% of all respondents participated in
other emergency measures. Several respondents wrote that they could not
participate because they were preoccupied with saving their belongings,
while others had no time to do so. Although no statistically significant
variation was observed with respect to participation in other emergency
measures between the respondents of the two selected cities, the survey data
show that the participation rate was slightly higher among the respondents
who did not experience flooding compared to those who did.
Levees were constructed along the two rivers passing through Arkansas City and Augusta to protect these cities from flooding. While undertaking emergency response measures, city officials in Arkansas City feared that
floodwater might top the levees at several points and they also identified
weak spots on the levees where breaching might occur. It was then deemed
necessary to raise the height of levees and enhance the strength of the levees
in several places. City personnel in Arkansas City and others participated in
filling sandbags and stacking them on levees. The National Guard was
mobilized to aid in the levee work in both cities and approximately 40
members of the nearby Winfield Correctional Facility were also utilized in
Arkansas City. Many individuals also attempted to protect their residences
by constructing sandbag diversions.
City authorities in Augusta were not aware of any threat that floodwaters would top the levee because they relied upon the information provided
to them by the National Weather Service. The information stated that the
crest would be several feet below the top of the levee and would occur 24
hours later. It actually topped the levee by two feet and crested 18 hours
earlier than predicted. As for identifying weak spots in the levee, city
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themselves after their friends told them that the dike had broken. Three
respondents evacuated their mobile homes because the gas line was disconnected by the gas company. Most respondents, however, expressed general
satisfaction with evacuation efforts undertaken by the Red Cross, Salvation
Army, and area churches.

Other Emergency Measures. Other emergency measures undertaken
by various organizations before and/or during the flooding included sandbagging, traffic control, and food distribution to flood victims. In addition
to the various emergency management agencies and city departments, area
churches, local and national voluntary organizations, and local businesses
participated in these emergency measures as did individual residents of
Arkansas City, Augusta, and neighboring communities.
The survey indicates that nearly 25% of all respondents participated in
other emergency measures. Several respondents wrote that they could not
participate because they were preoccupied with saving their belongings,
while others had no time to do so. Although no statistically significant
variation was observed with respect to participation in other emergency
measures between the respondents of the two selected cities, the survey data
show that the participation rate was slightly higher among the respondents
who did not experience flooding compared to those who did.
Levees were constructed along the two rivers passing through Arkansas City and Augusta to protect these cities from flooding. While undertaking emergency response measures, city officials in Arkansas City feared that
floodwater might top the levees at several points and they also identified
weak spots on the levees where breaching might occur. It was then deemed
necessary to raise the height of levees and enhance the strength of the levees
in several places. City personnel in Arkansas City and others participated in
filling sandbags and stacking them on levees. The National Guard was
mobilized to aid in the levee work in both cities and approximately 40
members of the nearby Winfield Correctional Facility were also utilized in
Arkansas City. Many individuals also attempted to protect their residences
by constructing sandbag diversions.
City authorities in Augusta were not aware of any threat that floodwaters would top the levee because they relied upon the information provided
to them by the National Weather Service. The information stated that the
crest would be several feet below the top of the levee and would occur 24
hours later. It actually topped the levee by two feet and crested 18 hours
earlier than predicted. As for identifying weak spots in the levee, city
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officials claimed that there was never a concern that the levee would fail.
After it was topped at the south end, their concern was that it would top at
other points around the community. City personnel in Augusta did fill
sandbags and place them in strategic locations, but not on levee tops, for
additional protection.
All areas of Arkansas City and Augusta that were already flooded or
had a high potential for flooding were blocked to traffic, and many roads
into these two towns had to be closed for several days because of the high
water. Individual volunteers and the National Guard were employed to help
divert traffic from flooded and/or flood-prone areas. The latter also helped
to patrol the dike to check for breaches or seepage and to protect evacuated
property.
The average satisfaction level with other emergency measures is less
than three, indicating that the respondents as a group were less than satisfied
(Table 2). Respondents indicated that the other emergency measures undertaken were less than adequate and not initiated in a timely manner. Among
the four emergency measures considered in this study, the category of other
emergency measures received the highest average satisfaction rating, followed by flood evacuation, flash flood watches, and flash flood warning.
However, all the scores remain below three, which suggests that respondents in general were not satisfied with the measures taken.
The average overall satisfaction scores of all four emergency measures
considered in this study are calculated for seven selected respondent characteristics: annual income, educational level, age, gender, flood experience,
flood insurance status at the time of flooding, and community of residence.
But the score differs statistically only in the case of the last variable. For this
reason, Table 2 presents satisfaction scores only by study sites. Respondents
in Arkansas City were more satisfied compared to their counterparts in
Augusta, but the average score for both communities is less than three,
indicating that respondents were less than satisfied with the performance of
city officials and emergency response agencies as a result of the flood of
November 1998.
One important reason for widespread dissatisfaction with emergency
response efforts in the study area was that respondents did not expect any
flooding to occur, and most city residents were not prepared for it. The
reason, in part, was that the levees generated a false sense of security in
residents, and many perceived that the threat of flooding had been eliminated through construction of the levees. Unfortunately, some of the levees
were over 40 years old, and a considerable number of respondents from both
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study sites complained that many levees were not properly maintained. City
officials in both selected cities, however, denied this complaint.
All indicators, including extent of damage incurred, evacuation rate,
and length of stay outside damaged homes, suggest that Augusta suffered
more from the November 18 flash flood than Arkansas City. City officials in
Augusta had little time to prepare for the flooding, but city authorities in
Arkansas City had 24 to 36 hours to organize emergency response plans.
Arkansas City is located about 50 miles (75 km) directly south of Augusta.
Both cities were flooded by two rivers; one of them (the Walnut River) was
a source of flooding for both cities. City officials in Arkansas City closely
monitored the water level of the Arkansas and Walnut Rivers. They reportedly contacted a majority of the residents in the I OO-year floodplain as well
as some residents in other parts of the city and warned them in advance.
Since Arkansas City is larger than Augusta, it has more manpower to
implement emergency measures relatively quickly and efficiently than Augusta. The size of city seems to be positively associated with satisfaction
level. and the amount of flood damage experienced by respondents appears
negatively associated with satisfaction level. Per capita losses in Augusta
were about three times higher than in Arkansas City. Additionally, the
number of respondents who experienced flooding was significantly higher
in Augusta than in Arkansas City. All these may help explain why the
average overall satisfaction scores statistically differed among the respondents of the two selected cities.
External Support Received and Level of Satisfaction with the Support.
Analysis of the survey data reveals that 81 (88.04%) of the 92 respondents
who experienced flooding received support, often from multiple sources.
The largest number of flood victims (92%) obtained support from volunteer
organizations, followed by government disaster programs (78%). The remaining three sources (insurance, business, and others) provided support to
less 20% of all respondents. The satisfaction rankings of these three sources
differ between the two study sites (Table 3).
Among volunteer organizations, the Red Cross, Salvation Army, and
area churches played a dominant role in providing support for flood victims
in both cities. Respondents also received support from several government
disaster programs, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency and
Small Business Adminstration actively participated in distributing emergency assistance among flood victims. To make it easier for flood victims to
obtain information and help, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
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TABLE 3
RESPONDENT SATISFACTION LEVEL WITH EXTERNAL SUPPORT
Satisfaction
Level

Arkansas City

Augusta

Total
14
12
25

I (very dissatisfied)
2 (dissatisfied)
3 (neither satisfied nor
dissatisfied)
4 (satisfied)
5 (very satisfied)
Total

4
1"
15

10

8
7
35

9
9
49

Average score
x'-value

3.29
9.074 (d.f.

11

10

2.91

= 3; p =0.028)

17

16
84b
3.07

"Merged with satisfaction level I to calculate the chi-square value.
Among 92 respondents who experienced flood damage, 84 received external support.

b

and the Kansas Division of Emergency Management established a Disaster
Recovery Center in Augusta.
The type of support received by flood victims included cash, checks,
low interest loans, credit utilities, food, cleaning supplies, furniture, rental
assistance, and clothing. Additionally, the Red Cross and Salvation Army
provided flood victims with vouchers to purchase clothing, food, and other
items to meet emergency needs. Often disaster victims suffer from depression and stress for many days following an event, yet not a single respondent
indicated they had received counseling. Three respondents, however, reported that their children had a difficult time after the flooding because the
flood damaged their toys. The assistant city manager of Augusta claimed
that many physicians and churches notified the city that they were willing to
provide counseling to the community. City staff members did a followup
inquiry on the amount of counseling provided to victims and, surprisingly,
very little assistance was requested.
When expressed as a dollar value, all support received by the respondents totaled about $590,000, which represents only 26% of the total damage reported by the respondents. In Arkansas City the actual monetary
support received was only 23% of the amount of damage reported by the
respondents; Augusta received 28%. Respondents in Augusta suffered more
damage from the flooding and consequently received greater support in
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terms of monetary value than respondents in Arkansas City. But the ratios of
aid to losses are similar in both communities. Note that all respondents who
experienced flood damage did not report the amount of support received;
therefore, the actual amount of support received is likely higher than the
reported amount.
Government sources rank first with respect to amount of support
provided to the flood victims, accounting for slightly over 64% of all
support received, followed by insurance companies, volunteer organizations, businesses, and other sources. As noted earlier, volunteer organizations provided support to the largest number of victims, yet these
organizations as a group rank third behind government sources and insurance companies in terms of value of the support offered (Fig. 5A).
Ranking and relative contribution by the four broad sources of support
considered in this study differ between the two study sites. In Arkansas City,
government emergency agencies provided as much as 81.6% of the total
value of all support received, but in Augusta only 60.16% (Fig. 5B and 5C).
The contributions of insurance agencies, business firms, and other groups as
sources of support to flood victims was lower in the Arkansas City relative
to Augusta. This may explain why government sources provided a higher
proportion of support to the respondents of Arkansas City than those of
Augusta.
Many respondents thought that the compensation they received for
reported losses was inadequate. As noted earlier, the various sources of
support were able to compensate only 26% of the total reported losses. For
this reason, flood victims had to make adjustments to their household
income level to compensate for damages caused by the flood. As many as 61
(66.3%) of the 92 respondents sold belongings, property, or spent previous
savings to mitigate flood damage. A number of respondents also borrowed
money from their friends and close relatives, and several respondents used
credit cards to defray expenses. This finding is consistent with existing
literature which suggests that victims bear the major share of losses caused
by a natural disaster and they aid themselves in coping with extreme events
(see White 1974; Burton et al. 1978; Smith1992; Hewitt 1997).
Typical of most natural disasters, some discontent was found with the
official response to this flash flood event (see Tobin and Montz 1994). As
many as 26 respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the services provided by FEMA. Specifically, most complained that it was hard to contact
FEMA personnel. They further criticized the slowness of the process required to receive payments and the incredible amount of documentation
required. Several respondents directed animosity in their remarks at Red
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-Figure 5. The percentage contribution of major sources to the total amount of
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Cross personnel. In contrast, many flood victims stated great apprec iation
for the assistance provided by the Salvation Army and area ch urches.
Respondents were asked to rate the overall satisfaction level with the
support th ey received from external sources. The level of satisfaction significantly differed only in the case of the community of re si dence. Of the 84
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respondents who rated their satisfaction level, 25 (29.76%) were neither
satisfied nor dissatisfied (Table 3). Thirty-three respondents (39.29%) were
either satisfied or very satisfied, while 26 (30.95%) were either dissatisfied
or very dissatisfied (Table 3). The average score is 3.07, which indicates that
respondents as a group were neither particularly satisfied nor dissatisfied
with the support they received from external sources.
Table 3 does show that respondents in Arkansas City were relatively
more satisfied with the assistance they received from external sources than
those in Augusta; such assistance may be related to the severity of the event.
Additionally, the dissatisfaction of Augusta respondents with the four selected emergency measures may influence the intensity of their dissatisfaction with the assistance they received from external sources. Respondent
satisfaction level with four emergency measure is consistent with their
satisfaction level with the external assistance they received during the postflood period (see Tables 2 and 3).
Satisfaction levels were placed into five categories. Among these
categories, the external assistance category received the highest average
rating. This finding is surprising since the amount of assistance received
accounted for only 26% of the total damage reported by the respondents. It
implies that the respondents were willing to accept a considerable amount of
loss from the flooding and knew, or at least were willing to accept, that the
amount of assistance they would receive from external sources would be
much less than the damage incurred. For this reason, they were not terribly
dissatisfied with the disaster relief and aid they received from external
sources.
Conclusion
Results of this study indicate that emergency response measures were
not implemented in a timely manner, particularly in Augusta. The city
authorities in Augusta had few hours to prepare, while Arkansas City authorities had more than 24 hours. Since Arkansas City is located about 50
miles directly south of Augusta, Arkansas City officials knew that flooding would also affect their city. Therefore, those officials closely monitored
the water levels of the Arkansas and Walnut Rivers. It appears that both
cities could have been equally prepared, but the short lead time created
problems for Augusta. There is also a size advantage for Arkansas City.
Because it is larger than Augusta, Arkansas City had more personnel to
prepare for the flood.
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Flood victims in both commumtIes received emergency assistance
from many sources. Although this assistance amounted to only one-fourth
of the total losses reported by respondents, their overall satisfaction level
was higher with the amount of support they received than with the four
emergency response measures. Various federal agencies took part in the
recovery and federal assistance played the major role in mitigating hazard
losses experienced by respondents.
Preparedness is one of the important determinants of victims' satisfaction with emergency measures undertaken by the concerned authorities in
the study area. Augusta was less prepared for the 1998 flood compared to
Arkansas City and thus received lower satisfaction scores from respondents. This is an important finding for both public and private agencies
involved in predisaster mitigation efforts. This study suggests that respondents' characteristics were not strongly related to their satisfaction levels
with emergency measures employed by local officials. The findings also
indicate that the extent of preparedness of a community from a potential
flood hazard depends on lead time available to public officials and the size
of the community.
In order to reduce damage caused by flooding in the future, officials
need to adopt a comprehensive flash flood watch and advanced warning
system, and implement a public awareness and preparedness campaign.
Emergency preparedness officials should also consider conducting emergency drills and/or initiate a flash flood awareness week or month every
year, which would be beneficial in keeping the risk of flash flooding in the
public consciousness.
At the same time, individuals must also act rationally if an emergency
does arise. Extensive public education may be useful, or even necessary, in
reducing the tendency to disregard a flash flood watch and/or warning.
Future research should examine the role of local officials in dealing with the
risks and uncertainties posed by extreme natural events. Problems confronted by officials in organizing emergency responses to an impending
natural event may also be an important focus for future study.
Although results of this study suggest that respondents were not satisfied with the emergency response measures undertaken before and/or during the flash flood event, no attempt was made to ask respondents why they
were not satisfied. This study further suggests that the respondents in general were not satisfied with most organizations involved in distributing
disaster assistance among the flood victims. However, many respondents
greatly appreciated the efforts of several organizations. Instead of seeking
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overall satisfaction level, future studies should consider respondents' satisfaction levels with each of the major agencies that participate in dispersing
disaster relief. Such studies will provide helpful insights to relevant authorities in preparing and managing future flood hazards in small communities.
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